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Mattei Ugo
THE RISE AND FALL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN ESSAY
FOR JUDGE GUIDO CALABRESI
UGO MATrEI*
INTRODUCTION
In this Essay I use law and economics and efficiency reasoning in
the law as a proxy in attempting to predict the fate of U.S. intellectual
leadership in the law. I argue that law and economics has significantly
contributed to the attainment of worldwide hegemony by U.S. legal
scholarship, mostly thanks to early work, such as that pioneered by
Guido Calabresi in the 1960s and 70s. I claim that later aspects of the
style and politics of law and economics have consumed much of its
early capital of prestige, and that the decline phase of the economic
approach in legal reasoning is well on its way. I further argue that the
fall of law and economics, due to its over-formalism, parochialism, and
western-centrism, allows a more general prediction on the beginning
of a decline phase of U.S. legal scholarship in the global scenario.
At the outset of this Essay I should make it clear that the political
success of a given scholarly legal paradigm (both domestically and in-
ternationally) should be seen as a social phenomenon quite indepen-
dent from that of the intellectual prestige of such a paradigm. For
example, legal formalism (in its many forms) has been (and, in part,
still is) the triumphant approach to legal reasoning in the arena of
legal practice, well after its intellectual prestige began its declining
phase. Similarly, law and economics can be intellectually very prestigi-
* Alfred and Hanna Fromm Professor of International and Comparative Law, U.C.
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ous, but at the same time politically very weak (such as during the
1980s through Europe), or it can be politically very powerful and in-
tellectually very weak. I argue that this last scenario is the case today,
when the mighty institutions of global governance (World Bank, In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization
(WTO)) endorse (and enforce) some of the most notoriously simplis-
tic ideas of law and economics. Also today mighty organizational ef-
forts (such as the European Association of Law and Economics)
produce a climate of optimism and self-congratulation that precludes
many law and economics scholars from understanding the beginning
of a decline in their international prestige.
Also, at the outset, I must add that this Essay is concerned only
with what can be seen as the core consensus of law and economics as an
approach to legal reasoning, which I consider to be the only relevant ver-
sion of law and economics. In a sense, I deal here with the main-
stream approach, and I do not do justice to the many more or less
successful and influential attempts to get beyond the mainstream. Ap-
proaches such as comparative law and economics or behavioral law
and economics are too circumscribed to be relevant at the global
level, and moreover, they oftentimes cannot be seen as genuine chal-
lenges to the core consensus.1 Consequently, my central argument
cannot be rebutted by showing specific samples of nonparochial, non-
ethnocentric, nonsimplistic, and non-ideological uses of the economic
approach. What has been turned into an industry, losing the original
critical bite that accounts for its rise as a global paradigm of legal rea-
soning, is this core consensus of law and economics pundits.
Finally, a note on my method. Because one of the most com-
monly diffused tactics in establishing hegemony is to naturalize the
status quo, as if social phenomena were not the product of history but
an epiphany of a somewhat unchallengeable nature of things, I will
discuss law and economics in a relatively deep comparative and histor-
ical context. In other words, I will begin my discussion well before
1960, the established year of the birth of law and economics, and I will
compare the present situation of U.S. legal hegemony with times in
which other countries, notably France and Germany, were hegemonic
1. For a variety of approaches, all of which I consider variations on the same consen-
sus, see NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAw: FROM POSNER
TO POST-MODERNISM (1997) (providing a noncritical overview of the dominant schools of
thought in the law and economics movement). A significant omission from that study is
the comparative law and economics school of thought, which is perhaps the only radical
break with the mainstream consensus. It is neither mentioned nor discussed in the book.
For an in-depth discussion of comparative law and economics, see Uco MATrEI, COMPARA-
TIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS (1997).
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in the Western legal tradition. There is a need for U.S. academics to
understand that their present position of international privilege and
scholarly advantage will not last forever.
I. THE UNITED STATES AS A CONTEXT OF RECEPTION
In previous papers I have outlined the fundamental structure of
what I call "the professional rule of law" and the historical reasons for
current American intellectual leadership in the world's legal land-
scape.2 The fundamental structure of American law has unfolded to
become a politically legitimized system in which the straight political
power of the government is counterbalanced by a set of professional
(countermajoritarian) checks: a judicial check and an academic
check. Such a system is the result of imports from Europe digested
and made spectacular by way of expansion in the United States.
By the early part of the last century, U.S. law had received from
Europe, and digested in a genuinely original way, the fundamental
components of its legal structure. The English common-law tradition
transmitted to the former colony the ideal of judges as oracles of the
law and of a strong, independent judiciary as an institutional frame-
work in which judges can perform their role as guardians of individual
rights. American law has developed this legacy and expanded it to the
point of inventing constitutional adjudication, an achievement that
was not accomplished even by the great Sir Edward Coke.' Judges are
not only the oracles of the law and the leaders of the professional
legal system, but they also have the power to declare, in the process of
adjudication, political decisionmaking as unconstitutional.4 Because
of such outstanding judicial power within American law, the belief,
already noticed by Alexis de Tocqueville,5 that any political problem
2. Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's Legal Systems,
45 Am.J. COMp. L. 5 (1997) (explaining "the rule of professional law"); Ugo Mattei, Why the
Wind Changed: Intellectual Leadership in Western Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 195 (1994) [herein-
after Why the Wind Changed] (examining U.S. leadership in the law).
3. Coke's dictum in Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K-B. 1610), is usually ac-knowledged as the English ancestor of the American concept ofjudicial review outlined in
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO EN-
GLISH LEGAL HISTORY 100 (1971); ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW 38 (1989). Lord Coke wrote that
in many cases, the common law will controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes
adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is against common
right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law
will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void.
Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652.
4. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178.
5. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 115 (Arthur Goldhammer
trans., Library of Am. 2004) (1835).
[VOL. 64:220
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may be sooner or later adjudicated by a court of law, has been carried
to its symbolic extreme in the Nuremberg Trials, and possibly to its
very limit in Bush v. Gore.6 Most importantly, the United States has
invented a legal tool-constitutional adjudication-that is now part of
the global legal consciousness.7
The civil-law tradition has also transmitted to the United States
several fundamental modes of thought that U.S. law has been busy
expanding. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
France conveyed to the United States the idea of universal individual
rights. These "negative" rights (or so-called "rights of first genera-
tion") have been enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, influential as
they were on the majority of the Founding Fathers.8 Not only has the
universalistic ideal been carried to the extreme, as witnessed by,
among other things, notions of universal jurisdiction of U.S. courts in
the vindication of such rights, but negative rights, in the absence of
thick notions of sovereignty and statehood developed by the
Jacobeans, became a genuine limit to the redistributive activity of the
American state. Notions of freedom from government intrusion were
by no means limited to judicial lawmaking in the Lochnet9 era. A
strong limit to any proactive role of government, except in such areas
as the military and defense, where massive transfers of wealth rou-
tinely happen, can be traced back to French-inspired notions of (eco-
nomic) rights.
In addition, Germany has transmitted to the United States one of
its fundamental present-day characteristics: the presence of strong, in-
dependent academic institutions that serve as a professional check on
the political process. It was only because the law was considered a
science, a clear legacy of German historicism, that it was natural to
argue for its teaching in university contexts."0 Otherwise law could
have remained a practical business, as it continued to be in England
until well after the Victorian age. Once imported to America, the Ger-
6. 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the
Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 237 (2002).
See generally Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89
CAL. L. REv. 1721 (2001) (providing a discussion of the decision in light of legal history).
7. I use "legal consciousness" in the sense of Duncan Kennedy, Two Globalizations of
Law & Legal Thought: 1850-1968, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 631, 634 (2003) [hereinafter Two
Globalizations].
8. For a recent, fascinating discussion of their credo and ideology, seeJosEPHJ. ELLIS,
FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION (2000).
9. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
10. On the impact of the German professorial model in the United States, see James
Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn's German Sources for the
Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 156 (1987).
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man professorial system has been boosted by the proliferation of pri-
vate academic institutions, typical of this side of the ocean. Today,
American law schools (professional schools staffed with faculty that
regard themselves as academic scholars) are the only schools in the
world that offer basic legal education at the graduate school level.
Consequently, and paradoxically for a system based on "professional
schooling," the average American lawyer is exposed to more years of
academic training than any other colleague in the world. Moreover,
American academia can well be seen today as the global lawyer's grad-
uate school; many ambitious lawyers worldwide complete their under-
graduate legal education in the United States." The graduate law
program is, therefore, another powerful tool in the worldwide diffu-
sion of U.S. law.
U.S. law in its early phase did not only import from Europe, but
other fundamental characteristics of its structure can be seen as origi-
nal reactions against European models of law. Among such, one
should at least mention the written constitution-a reaction against
the arbitrary nature of British unwritten constitutional law-and, es-
pecially for purposes of this Essay, the high degree of decentraliza-
tion-another reaction against the strongly centralized nature of the
English system of government. Decentralization is possibly the most
original aspect of the fundamental structure of U.S. law. 2 No other
legal system in the world has developed a full-fledged federal judicial
system as complete and complex as the United States has. The co-
existence of a large number of federal and state courts made issues ofjurisdiction and choice-of-law the primary concerns of the American
legal profession from its very beginning. Moreover, the decentralized
nature of the system makes it only natural to approach legal problems
in light of a fundamental question: Which of the many possible com-
peting legal answers is actually best? These issues again make it natu-
ral to compare possible legal solutions from an efficiency
perspective. 13 No wonder law and economics, as an approach to legal
11. See Wolfgang Wiegand, The Reception of American Law in Europe, 39 AM. J. COMP. L.
229, 235 (1991) (describing the growing trend of European lawyers seeking an American
legal education).
12. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (4th ed. 1996).
13. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAw, EC-
ONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 28-29 (1994) (explaining the importance of the comparative
institutional analysis as a component of law and economics); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GE-
NIUS OF AMERICAN COPORATE LAw 1 (1993) (noting that the federalist system of American
corporate law enables businesses to choose the state whose legal structure minimizes their
costs of doing business the most).
224 [VOL. 64:220
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reasoning grounded in efficiency concerns, emerged in the 1960s,
right after the Harvard legal process school, the school of thought
whose method was grounded in comparative institutional analysis.14
Moreover, and most interesting for a study on the expansion of the
American pattern of jurisprudence, the issues concerning the every-
day American practitioner (Which court has jurisdiction? What law
applies?) are the very same issues on the table of any lawyer approach-
ing a legal problem of international relevance.1 5 Thus, at the dawn of
economic globalization, American lawyers already enjoy a legal cul-
ture and a political discourse that is broader than jurisdictional limits,
and this makes them comparatively better equipped than their for-
eign colleagues to approach the problems posed by economic global-
ization. In this scenario, the "annexing" of one more jurisdiction,
wherever located, does not particularly change the U.S. lawyer's way of
reasoning. 6
The globalization of the economy and the global demise of the
activist state, crucial to the neoliberal project and commenced in the
early 1980s by the so-called Reagan-Thatcher revolution, proved to be
the ideal nurturing environment for the rise of law and economics as
the most influential global mode of legal thought in the aftermath of
the Cold War. 7 With (conservative) economists taking over the major
role as policymakers both in the United States and abroad, it has been
a natural consequence that those lawyers (mostly American) able to
engage in a dialogue with economists, the masters of a hegemonic
social science, would enjoy a major advantage.18 More generally, and
14. See GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CEN-
TURY'S END 83 (1995) (observing that the rise of law and economics coincided with the
decline of the legal process school and the rise of comparative and interdisciplinary legal
analysis).
15. SeeYvEs DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMER-
CIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1996).
16. The very structure of the American judicial process privatizes power and activity by
significantly reducing the "public domain" aspects of litigation. Various activities within
litigation that are labeled "official" in European legal systems, including service of process,
discovery, or questioning of witnesses, are already private matters in American law. RU-
DOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT, MATERIALS 428, 448 (6th ed.
1998). This creates a base for what has been recently called an "entrepreneurial trans-
plant." SeeJonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History
and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 849-54
(2003).
17. Cf YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS:
LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES (2002)
(providing examples of the exportation of economic and legal institutions and practices to
Latin American countries).
18. See generally Robert D. Cooter, Law and the Imperialism of Economics: An Introduction to
the Economic Analysis of Law and a Review of the Major Books, 29 UCLA L. REv. 1260 (1982).
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again for a variety of reasons that are beyond the limited scope of this
Essay, the prestige of U.S. law increased for legal professionals world-
wide, so that the intellectual leadership of American law emerged as
an indisputable fact. Is this leadership going to last? In this Essay,
following the parable of law and economics, I argue that the rising
phase is over, and that the declining phase has started.
II. U.S. HEGEMONY AND GLOBAL LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS
While, as shown in Part I, the roots for the "naturalization" of the
American way of reasoning in the global era can be traced quite far
back, the parable of law and economics begins only during the heart
of the Cold War, reaches its peak in the decade following the fall of
the Berlin Wall, and, I argue, begins its intellectual decline at the very
beginning of the new millennium, when American intellectual, politi-
cal, and moral leadership is questioned worldwide with unprece-
dented energy. The growing resistance against the global
neoliberalism led by American scholars seems to target many of its
intellectual darlings, including lawyer-economists and other policy
pundits, whose role, in the ironically short age of the "end of his-
tory, ' 9 has been to attempt to turn conservative politics into neutral
technology.
Generally speaking, the paradigmatic shift in legal reasoning,
produced by law and economics as a fundamental challenge to the
hierarchical relationship between the legal system and market activity,
has been boosted by the globalization of the economy, where the
boundaries of the markets are less and less limited by those of the
state. In fact, markets today are stronger institutions than states them-
selves, so much so that the mighty corporate actors of the global econ-
omy control the legal system rather than being controlled by it.2"
Because of this power shift, some "predictions" of law and economics
turned out to be quite accurate, which serves as an argument in praise
of law and economics as a realistic approach. Nevertheless, the pres-
tige in the global arena of legal thinking is not only the result of cyni-
cism in the description of the social "reality," which in present times
appears, upon close look, even worse than the most cynical theorists
are able to imagine. A scholarly paradigm in the law must provide
some value judgment, and prestige usually stems from the strengths of
19. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992) (discussing
Hegel's concept that the end of history would occur with the adoption of liberal democ-
racy as the preferred form of human government).
20. See NOREENA HERTZ, THE SILENT TAKEOVER: GLOBAL CAPITALISM AND THE DEATH OF
DEMOCRACY 7-8 (2001).
[VOL. 64:220
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its critique. Consequently, the rise and fall of law and economics
should also be understood in terms of academic developments and
modes of thought in the global arena of legal theories. 21 There is no
way to understand the impact and prestige of a legal movement if our
perspective is only local.
For example, constitutional law scholars are the "big dogs" in the
United States without question, as they engage in the most rewarding
and prestigious academic activity. Nevertheless, in the global arena,
despite strong institutional and political efforts to export the ideas
and notions of U.S. constitutional law worldwide, constitutional law is
perceived as an intimately domestic business, making the famous U.S.
constitutional law scholars, dominating as they are in the domestic
academic environment, quite irrelevant figures in the global perspec-
tive. In order to acquire some influence, these scholars must reinvent
themselves as comparative experts, or as general jurists, which is by no
means the case for the economists (and law and economics experts)
who simply keep doing abroad what they are busy doing at home: dis-
cussing abstract models with little worry about the complexities of re-
ality. More generally, in a world that is today largely privatized, the
global arena is reserved for private-law scholars, which is the area of
the law in which most contributions of law and economics are located.
Because of the subject matter of this Essay, my concern is the
influence of law and economics outside of its birthplace in the United
States. I am also analyzing a context that has attracted much attention
in international legal scholarship worldwide: that of legal trans-
plants.22 The recent wave of American legal hegemony can be seen
more clearly (and is much more significant) as a change in legal con-
sciousness, rather than as a pattern of transplantation of legal rules.
Legal reception is a highly creative activity,23 and legal transplants
would be severely misunderstood in their nature if they were ap-
proached only as a mechanical import-export exercise.24 It is thus im-
21. Today the literature on law and economics as an intellectual movement is quite
extensive.
22. See generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW
(2d ed. 1993). Watson explains that the theory of legal transplants is the "moving of a rule
or a system of law from one country to another, or from one people to another." Id. at 21.
23. See ELISABETrA GRANDE, IMITAZIONE E DiRrrIro: IPOTESI SULLA CIRCOLAZIONE DEI
MODELLI (2000); see also P.G. Monateri & F.A. Chiaves, Shifting Frames: Law and Legal "Con-
taminations," in INTRODUCTION TO ITALIAN LAW 21, 21-30 (Jeffrey S. Lena & Ugo Mattei eds.,
2002) (analyzing the importation of rules and institutions into the Italian legal culture
from France and Germany). The literature on legal transplants is now very extensive.
24. Considering the law as a mechanical commodity that can be imported or exported
like a television set or a Land Rover is also a strategy of governance. See Ugo Mattei, Legal
Pluralism, Legal Change and Economic Development, in NEW LAW FOR NEW STATES: POLITICA
2005]
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portant to approach the impact of law and economics, as "invented"
in the United States by Guido Calabresi and diffused in Richard Pos-
ner's simplified form, in the broader historical and transnational con-
text of legal scholarship. 25
The institutional background of U.S. law provided the highly
original context in which the legal process school, the first genuinely
original paradigm of American legal scholarship, developed its analy-
sis in the 1950s.26 Before legal process, scholarly movements in the
United States were mere reproductions of European modes of
thought, such as German dogmatic thinking (known in the United
States as formalism) or sociological jurisprudence (known in the
United States as legal realism). Because the United States is the only
fully federalized judicial system in the world, U.S. law must, therefore,
cope with a unique number of potential conflicts between institu-
tional actors. This practice naturally forces lawyers to develop a tre-
mendously sophisticated consciousness of the practical importance of
who decides what in litigation matters.27
Within the U.S. legal culture, the unprecedented degree of anti-
formalist reasoning, due to forty years of legal realism dominance,
called for some reaction. In Germany and France, the two leading
exponents of the civil-law tradition, sociological jurisprudence (also
known as anti-formalism) has never succeeded in moving beyond the
status of a critical current of legal thought; it remains only marginally
DEL DIRITTO IN ERITREA 23 (L. Favali et al. eds., 1998). See generally LAURA NADER, THE LIFE
OF THE LAW: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROJECTS 117-67 (2002) (examining hegemonic processes
in the law from colonial and contemporary settings).
25. For a discussion of changes in current private-law thinking in Europe, see MARTUN
W. HESSELINK, THE NEW EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURE (2001) (arguing that European schol-
ars should study the economic effect of different rules of private law and uphold one rule
over another if it is more efficient). For a more nuanced position, however, see Mathias
Reimann, Droit Positifet CultureJuridique. L'am ricanisation du Droit Europgen par Rception, in
45 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT. AM.R1CANISATION DU DROIT 61 (2001) (discussing
Americanization as a change in mentality).
26. The legal process school has received a recent revival of attention thanks to the
1994 publication of its defining book, HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr.
& Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (1958). For an analysis that merges legal process and law
and economics, see KOMESAR, supra note 13. Predating the legal process school, the roots
of both legal formalism and legal realism can be traced to Europe. See Kennedy, Two
Globalizations, supra note 7, at 637-40 (discussing the globalization of the European classical
legal thought).
27. For some flavor, see the other "classic" publication on the legal process school,
Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System. FALLON ET AL., supra note 12;
see also Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REv. 688 (1989) (reviewing PAUL M.
BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (3d ed.
1988)).
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influential outside of legal scholarship. 8 In the United States, on the
other hand, legal realism seized the leading posture among legal ap-
proaches in academia, and became important in the judiciary and the
administrative state.29 As a result, when American lawyers began per-
forming their role as "hidden law givers"3" too candidly, they began
experiencing a I-ss of legitimacy that weakened their professional
project."1
Attempts to reinforce that legitimacy and the professional project
of lawyers produced the legal process school in public law (remember
Wechsler's Neutral Principles3 2), and law and economics in private law.
These movements had no foreign models to inspire them, and were
consequently genuine "inventions" of U.S. legal scholarship.
If seen in the domestic perspective of U.S. law, both legal process
and law and economics share an ambiguous relationship with formal-
ism and realism. There are, however, important structural differences
between the two. It would be difficult to imagine the birth of the legal
process school outside of the very peculiar U.S. federal system. Mean-
while, because of the nature of economic reasoning, economic analy-
sis of the law tends to be a universalistic paradigm.
3
" As a
consequence of this different degree of local specificity, only law and
economics has become a worldwide hegemonic form of legal
consciousness.
III. THE RISE OF EFFICIENCY REASONING IN THE UNITED STATES
Herman Oliphant, a leading legal realist, urged law students and
lawyers to get out of the libraries.34 The law library, and the legal
28. See 2 CARLO AUGUSTO CANNATA & ANTONIO GAMBARO, LINEAMENTI DI STORIA DELLA
GIURISPRUDENZA EUROPEA: DAL MEDIOEVO ALL'EPOCA CONTEMPORANEA (4th ed. 1989).
29. For appraisals of the realist hegemony in U.S. law, see GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES
OF AMERICAN LAw (1977), and BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 105-10
(1984).
30. See Antonio Gambaro, Il Successo del Giurista, 106 IL FORo ITLAJANO 86 (1983).
31. I use the term "professional project" in the sociological sense developed in MAGALI
SARFATrrl LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977).
32. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1959).
33. See Mattei, Why the Wind Changed, supra note 2, at 216 (noting "that law and eco-
nomics is... an effort to understand the forces that are at play in the law and not in 
any
particular legal system").
34. See Herman Oliphant, The Public and the Law-The Three Major Criticisms of the Law
and Their Validity, 18 A-B.A. J. 787, 793 (1932). Oliphant stated:
[S]uch have been the traditions of legal scholarship among which all students of
law have grown up that, with enough time to review, almost any one of them
could probably expound the technical legal definition of larceny and win for it
general admiration of the symmetry and completeness of the logical development
20051
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materials therein, have long been the entire universe of the Western
lawyer. To the textual tradition dominant in the Continent at least
since the age of the glossators, only a very limited correction has been
posed by the common-law tradition, despite its self-portrait as "non-
written" law. Christopher Columbus Langdell used to say that appel-
late opinions, themselves a literary form, are the raw materials in the
laboratory of the lawyer-scientist.35 Consequently, getting out of the
libraries was indeed a revolutionary program in the 1930s because law-
yers had never really dwelled outside of them.
In order to get out of the library, lawyers needed guides. Karl
Llewellyn, another leading legal realist, knocked at the door of an-
thropologist E. Adamson Hoebel to explore forms of "legal life"
outside of libraries.3 6 Many other realists, too, agreed that nonlawyers
were needed on law faculties in order to develop nontextual para-
digms of thought.37 Among such nonlawyers appointed in law facul-
ties we find many of the founding fathers of law and economics,
including leading Chicago economists Aaron Director and Ronald
Coase.
During the age of triumphant realism, some lawyers, rather than
choosing economists as co-authors, preferred a first-hand journey in
economic knowledge. Among these scholars equipping themselves to
venture alone, out of libraries, one finds the true creator of law and
economics: Guido Calabresi.
Lawyers, to be sure, did not limit themselves to using their guides
for an intellectual journey outside of textual reasoning. Not all of
them, however, were searching for critical approaches to challenge
the status quo of the law, and sought, with the tool of economics, bet-
ter approaches for looking into "dark places." 8 Many lawyers, partic-
which legal scholarship has given it. But if he were asked to state something as tothe limits of the criminal law's effective control of pawnbrokers as possible culpa-ble receivers of stolen property, he might ransack law libraries but would have to
stand mute.
Id.
35. G. Edward White, The Impact of Legal Science on Tort Law, 1880-1910, 78 COLUM. L.REV. 213, 220-22 (1978). On Langdell and the realist's critique, the most interesting and
vivid read remains, in my opinion, Grant Gilmore's The Ages of American Law. See GILMORI,
supra note 29, at 42-48. For a more recent and longer narrative of the intellectual events
surrounding the development of legal realism, see MORTONJ. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMA-
TION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992).
36. NADER, supra note 24, at 85-101.
37. See GILMORE, supra note 29, at 87-88.
38. GuIoO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 180 (1982) ("As ascholar, it is my job to look in dark places and try to describe, as precisely as I can, what I
see.").
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ularly those located on the more conservative side of the political
spectrum, felt that decades of dominant legal realism required a re-
structuring of the lawyer's legitimacy and the professional project.
The law, as a fundamentally conservative construct, needed to be re-
furbished in order to reclaim some objectivity if legal scholars and
judges were to keep their role as hidden law givers. To consider the
law as the fiat of the last decisionmaker, as legal realists did, exposes
the legal profession to a fundamental challenge: If law is as biased as
the political preferences of the decisionmaker, then why should the
decisionmaker be a professional lawyer rather than a politician, a doc-
tor, or a car dealer?
In Western jurisprudence, science has traditionally served the
purpose of asserting the special role of lawyers as decisionmakers, de-
spite their lack of political legitimacy. But if the metaphor of biology
and geometry, much cherished by Langdell and his formalistic follow-
ers, 39 could no longer serve that purpose, "social science" would do
the trick.4" And among the social sciences, the queen, to be sure, was
economics.41 Richard Posner is associated with this fundamental con-
tribution-saving the lawyer's profession from the legitimacy conse-
quences of being too "candid."42
Hence, economics could offer a good guide outside of the black-
letter law and a new, strong source of legitimacy. After all, economists
were focusing on incentives, and incentives meant focusing on the be-
havior of the recipients of legal precepts. Thus, something began
happening outside of and beyond the legal texts. Economists, more-
over, while working on public-choice theory, were themselves focusing
on something outside of the text. These economists worried about
the production of norms, about law in the making, the processes and
.the forces determining its content (e.g., rent-seeking).43 While tradi-
tionally the lawyer, including American legal realists as fundamentally
positivistic lawyers, focused on the legal norm and precepts as they are
(or as they should be), economists, by contrast, were claiming that the
39. GILMORE, supra note 29, at 42.
40. Id. at 87-88.
41. Cooter, supra note 18, at 1260-61.
42. A lawyer from the University of Chicago, with no formal economics training, Rich-
ard Posner, later to become a federal appellate judge, started to flood legal scholarship
with his tremendous productivity from the early seventies. His book, Economic Analysis of
Law, is considered a classic in the field. See RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
(6th ed. 2003) [hereinafter ECONOMIC ANALYSIS].
43. SeeJAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENr: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962) (describing a theory of collective
choice); Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice and the Law, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE: DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 171 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
20051
HeinOnline  -- 64 Md. L. Rev. 231 2005
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
focus should be turned toward what is before (public choices) and
after (incentive-reactive behavior) the legal precept. These econo-
mists argued that the focus should be on the process and on the social
consequences of the outcome of such process.44
As to legitimacy, economics handbooks mostly contained rhetoricgrounded in science and objectivity.45 The early success of efficiency
reasoning in the law can thus be justified by at least two factors: (1)
once the focus is on the process, then anyone would accept that theprocess should be efficient; and (2) efficiency claimed objectivity, an
essential element in a strategy of legitimization.46 While justice is thedomain of subjective feelings, efficiency is the domain of objectivity, as
it offers only a few clearly spelled-out concepts.47
Economists had their agenda too, so law and economics not only
was serving the needs and the curiosity of lawyers, but those of econo-
mists too. And that agenda, even for the economists, was common toboth conservatives and progressives. The more open-minded econo-
mists, such as Ronald Coase early in his career, believed that the disci-plinary segregation between the legal and economic disciplines was
absurd. 48 After all, earlier, law and economics were not even separatedisciplines, as proven by the fact that the founding father of modern
economics, Adam Smith, was a professor of jurisprudence.49 It was
only positivism, an approach that by the late nineteenth century had
conquered both disciplines, that almost paradoxically created the cul-
tural impossibility to communicate between them.
For economists, positivism meant the full separation betweenfacts and values, between the is and the ought, between positive and
normative discourses.50 Economists simply could not communicate
with lawyers anymore, given the constant confusion between the levels
of discourse that characterizes lawyer-talk aboutjustice. The few econ-
omists, such as Thorstein Veblen or John Commons, who attempted
to overtake the logic of economic positivism by maintaining a dia-
44. Public-choice theory here was teaching the same lesson of the Harvard legal pro-
cess school.
45. See DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1998).46. My explanation for these tw-3 factors that account for the early success of efficiency
reasoning in the law is developed in MArrEi, supra note 1, at 20-22.47. Id. at 4 ("[T]here are only a couple notions of efficiency accepted by the estab-lished economic paradigm ... and there are as many notions ofjustice asjudging individu-
als." (footnote omitted)).
48. E.g., R.H. COASE, THE FIRoM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAw 31 (1988).49. MAI mI, supra note 1, at 41-42; see ADAM SMITH AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS (Robin Paul Malloy & Jerry Evensky eds., 1994).50. MATTEI, supra note 1, at 6-11; see also Avery Wiener Katz, Positivism and the Separation
of Law and Economics, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2229 (1996).
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logue with lawyers and institutions, focused on issues of distributions
naturally falling between the two domains. Consequently, they were
accused of socialism and marginalized by the economic orthodoxy.
2
For lawyers, to the contrary, positivism meant full separation of
the domain of law from that of morality, politics, society, and whatever
is considered to be "outside" of that which the authority poses as law.
53
Positivism meant, in Kelsenian terms, a pure theory of the law. In this
perspective, economists were tainted by their constant policy dis-
courses, something beyond the pure idea of the legal system.
54
This separation of lawyers and economists exacted a high toll that
became quite visible when the oil crisis of the 1970s compelled us to
rethink some priorities. On the lawyer's side, the welfare state had
been constructed with very little attention to the economic impact of
its regulations, so that by the time of the oil crisis, its sustainability
began to be questioned more and more successfully, particularly in
England and the United States. On the economist's side, Keynesian
policy, so crucial in recovering from the depression of the 1930s, was
developed without considering the legal structure of its implementa-
tion, in particular the autonomy and strengths of the legal and bu-
reaucratic structure capable of defeating, by complex patterns of
resistance, any macro-reform.
Consequently, while some economists were eager to better under-
stand the legal picture, hence overcoming the costs of decades of in-
communicability, other economists, attacking Keynesian policy, were
assessing the legal structure of property rights. These economists also
assessed the political process from a public-choice model in order to
reclaim for microeconomics what Keynesianism had transferred, ar-
guably unsuccessfully, at the macroeconomic policy level.
55 Public-
choice theorists, monitoring the distortions of the political process (in
particular those of legislation and regulation) were finding their natu-
ral allies in the early work of apologists of the common-law tradition,
such as Richard Posner. An alliance in the name of efficiency and
objectivity developed, where issues of distribution and justice, so cru-
51. See MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 700-03 (5th ed. 1997) (discuss-
ing institutional economics and the contributions of Veblen and Commons).
52. Id. at 702-03.
53. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW I (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 2d ed.
1967) (1934).
54. See id. ("The Pure Theory of Law is a theory of positive law.... It is a science of law
(jurisprudence), not legal politics.").
55. Macey, supra note 43.
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cial to both the analysis of Guido Calabresi and the realist legacy of
the New Deal, were simply left behind.5 6
Law and economics would not have attained a dominant, global
role if it had not been leveraged, beginning in the Reagan years, by a
full-fledged political agenda and a real industry, capable of flooding
with cash any movement that gave cultural prestige to deregulation
and other reactionary politics of those years. It is proof enough tolook at the early lukewarm reception of the law and economics move-
ment in Europe to understand how much lawyers were willing to resist
the ideal of efficiency in the name of justice and distribution.57 But
the multiplication of prestigious law professor chairs, endowed re-
search facilities, and fellowships, such as the U.S. academia (the globalgraduate school), created a certain recipe for global success.58
To be sure, I do not wish to explain every social and political
phenomenon as determined by economic forces and incentives. It is
certainly true, nevertheless, that for the young American scholar grad-
uating in the early 1980s, it was a smart career move to get into law
and economics rather than, say, comparative law. Nevertheless, there
are other reasons, too. In the comparative literature, for example, it
has been pointed out that the success of an academic paradigm in the
law is connected to its apparently easy adaptability in different con-
texts, which is mostly due to more or less marked forms of universal-
ism. Alan Watson, for example, has offered evidence of the
widespread diffusion of nutshells and other teaching manuals such as
Gaius's Institutes, or Blackstone's Commentaries.5' The same insights
emerge from comparing the rate of diffusion of the very simple Napo-leonic Code with the technically sophisticated and complex language
of the German Civil Code, the Burgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB).6
More generally, it has been observed that the less a legal approach is
positivistic and context-specific the more it circulates,6 and other aes-
56. See Francesco Pulitini, Quante Analisi Economiche del Diritto? Rflessioni su Yale e Chi-
cago, I MERCATO CONCORRENZA REGOLE 139 (2003).
57. See R. Cooter & J. Gordley, Economic Analysis in Civil Law Countries: Past, Present,
Future, 11 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 261, 262 (1991).
58. For example, millions of dollars were donated by the conservative John Olin Foun-dation to the development of law and economics research centers at some of the mostprestigious universities in the United States, such as Harvard, Yale, and Berkeley. See, e.g.,
Press Release, Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School Receives $10 Million Grant from
John M. Olin Foundation (May 19, 2003), at http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2003/05/
19_olin.php.
59. Alan Watson, The Importance of "Nutshells," 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1994).
60. Mattei, Wy the Wind Changed, supra note 2, at 201-03.
61. See id. at 195-96 (positing "an inverse relationship between leadership in Western
law and the degree of positivism and localism of a given legal culture").
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thetical characteristics of the law, such as self-portrayals of high ad-
vancement or general ambiguity, have been used to explain the
diffusion of legal ideas.62 Many such characteristics fit the economic
reasoning in the law. Relative simplicity, political ambiguity,
63 self-
congratulatory mood, nonpositivism (in the legal sense), and univer-
salism are all characteristics of law and economics as exported world-
wide by such "nutshells" as Posner's or Polinsky's.64
Historically, the way in which a new, politically powerful para-
digm of research is able to seize a leading position in a plurality of
cultural contexts is usually by making previous approaches look obso-
lete and primitive. For example, French exegetic methodology has
long been considered obsolete by those who subscribe to the much
more elegant and scientific German-Pandectist approach.
65 It may
have also been the case of the Franco-German-inspired "social ap-
proach," which was advertised as a step forward in civilization from the
previous Lochner-era's individualism.66 Law and economics certainly
used this strategy to seize a global role by offering an expansive
universalistic model that expresses itself in English (the new lingua
franca), that retains an open dialogue with economics (the queen of
social sciences), and that claims to be the new natural legal order of
the global age. The legal order thus proposed, short of being politi-
cally legitimized, receives its legitimacy and desirability from the in-
trinsic virtues of efficiency, the sole value capable of granting general
access to the global capitalist marketplace.
The economic approach to the law, short of being a mode of gov-
ernance in need of legitimacy like any other legal order, has thus be-
come the technological backbone of the global market, something to
be approached apolitically, to be described and modified only by tech-
nological practices. For the first time after the Cold War, funding be-
came available for scholars who wished to be the technocrats and the
engineers of this apolitical system. With these assumptions, any schol-
arly approach that still considers the law a political institution that
62. GRANDE, supra note 23; Anna di Robilant, The Aesthetics of Law, 1 GLOBAL JURIST
ADVANCES, No. 2, Art. 1 (2001).
63. This aspect is emphasized by Duncan Kennedy as a key to understanding the diffu-
sion of legal ideas: legal theories and movements can successfully globalize if they are
politically ambiguous and therefore adaptable to new contexts. Kennedy, Two Globaliza-
tions, supra note 7, at 634.
64. Two of the most successful "first generation" book-length treatments of the disci-
pline are POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 42, and A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1989).
65. Mattei, Why the Wind Changed, supra note 2, at 215. See generally Rodolfo Sacco, Legal
Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 Am. J. COMP. L. 1 (1991).
66. See Kennedy, Two Globalizations, supra note 7, at 649-50.
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cannot be understood and described in graphs and numbers is dis-
posed of as obsolete. Any approach that requires something other
than a reactive minimal philosophy of governance is, after the fall of
the Berlin Wall, entirely out of fashion. The law must create incen-
tives for market actors. The skilled lawyer and policymaker is unap-
preciated if his suggestions require a proactive and expensive activist
government posture, let alone if he argues for economic redistribu-
tion by taxation or other obsolete Keynesian measures. The legal
scholar can only count on the natural existence of markets: his role is
to produce a correct set of market incentives. The quintessential ex-
ample of this attitude is the celebrated "self-enforcing" model of cor-
porate reform produced by leading corporate law scholar Bernard
Black, for the Russian Federation.67
IV. EXPORTING EFFICIENCY REASONING: EUROPE AS A
CONTEXT OF RECEPTION
While it would be grossly exaggerated to claim that law and eco-
nomics enjoys today the leading role as an approach to legal scholar-
ship in European countries, we can, nevertheless, see that efficiency
reasoning is the main intellectual vehicle used by the American legal
consciousness to diffuse itself and to impose its hegemony in the
center as well as in the periphery of the world. Efficiency is indeed
the buzzword of the neoliberal project. Itjustifies most of the policies
of the so-called "Washington consensus," from the demise of the wel-fare state to privatization, from downsizing to outsourcing. The ex-
pansionistic and universalistic blend of neoclassical economic analysis,
together with the thick layer of ideological assumptions that are em-bedded in such economic reasoning, lie behind the intellectual suc-
cess of this approach to law.68 A very clear bias in favor of the
efficiency of the common-law adjudication process promotes the
courts of law as the most important actors of the legal system.6 9 The
privatization and structural reforms sustained by the international in-
stitutions of global governance make law and economics one of the
most important cultural currents that diffuse tacit assumptions of
U.S.-based legal consciousness.7 °
67. Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109
HARv. L. REv. 1911 (1996).
68. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economics from the Perspective of Critical LegalStudies, in 2 THE NEW PALCRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAw 465 (Peter
Newman ed., 1998).
69. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 42, at 529-51 (comparing the efficiency
of common-law adjudication with the relative inefficiency of the political process).
70. MATTEI, supra note 1, at 226-27.
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Law and economics began to be transplanted into European con-
texts71 by a systematic organizational structure, the European Associa-
tion of Law and Economics, which began its operations in the late
1980S.72 The most significant evidence of the relevance of the law and
economics approach in Europe is not only the increasing number of
specialized papers that appear in law journals, but also the increasing
number of European publications in the area, as well as monographs,
periodicals, and encyclopedias. Much more significant is that Euro-
pean scholars not self-identified as law and economics acolytes, many
of whom are the very same scholars that throughout the 1980s re-
jected efficiency reasoning in the name ofjustice as the only polar star
of the lawyer, are now becoming more and more familiar with the
general jargon and ideas of law and economics. Very often today, effi-
ciency reasoning, in a somewhat simplified form, can be found even
in more mundane legal scholarship.
Once transplanted outside of its context of production, law and
economics displays a high level of ambiguity that allows it to flour-
ish.73 Conservative scholars admire its intellectual elegance; more
progressive and liberal scholars see its potential in subverting the
highly formalistic and black-letter flavor of local law and claim that the
conservative political bias is something that can be left on the other
side of the ocean.74 Initial resistance by the mainstream legal scholar-
ship has been successfully tackled. Like the debates of the early 1980s
in the United States75 and in Europe ten years later, law and econom-
ics persuaded a significant number of legal scholars and professionals
that issues of distribution are better addressed by taxation than by ad-
judication.76 Efficiency reasoning, therefore, should become the po-
lar star of legal interpretation. Thus, many European scholars have
71. Then, following the European lead, to Latin America, Asia, and elsewhere.
72. For background on the European Association of Law and Economics, visit http://
nts4.oec.uni-osnabrueck.de/eale/index.html. This society, mostly composed of European
scholars, some of whom are former American law students, has achieved considerable suc-
cess. It has generated quite a substantial network of European individuals and academic
programs active in the field, including a variety of specialized programs and research
centers.
73. See Kennedy, Two Globalizations, supra note 7, at 633-35 (explaining the ambiguous,
and thus adaptable, political nature of the legal movements that have globalized success-
fully over the last century).
74. See Pulitini, supra note 56 (offering a critical appraisal by an early Italian scholar in
law and economics on the opportunity to consider Chicago-style and other brands of law
and economics as a movement sharing enough commonalities to be approached within a
unitary taxonomic scheme).
75. See Symposium, Change in the Common Law: Legal and Economic Perspectives, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 189 (1980); Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. Rxv. 485 (1980).
76. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 3-4 (3d ed. 2000).
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become attracted to law and economics, and, even when carefully lim-
iting its use to relatively safe areas such as patrimonial private law,
continue to pave the way to a mode of thought subversive of the tradi-
tional relationship between the law and the market.
The distinctive American pedigree of law and economics, never-
theless, leaves open a variety of fundamental questions that should be
approached within a broad historical context in which present trends
are not taken for granted and the political meaning of local specifici-
ties are fully appreciated. Such an exercise is even more critical if law
and economics aims to establish itself as one of the fundamental
methodologies of the new global legal order. Unfortunately, ques-
tions of legitimacy, power, and hegemony are never posed by the Eu-
ropean users of economic reasoning in the law. There is no trace on
that side of the ocean of the kind of fundamental discussions of the
implications of economic legal reasoning that, in the early 1980s
(before law and economics was transformed into an industry), were
posed in the United States by lawyers and philosophers who were will-
ing to confront the intellectual arrogance and simple-mindedness of
so many economists.77 To the contrary, efficiency reasoning is ac-
cepted as a form of necessary realism when facing such daunting tasks
on the agenda of the modern European legal scholar as confronting
the issue of private-law integration.7"
Observing the European legal systems from the perspective of the
reception of U.S. ideas such as efficiency reasoning in the law shows a
greater division and a greater need to distinguish the differences that
one might expect. Too apparent to be neglected is the wide gap be-
tween Northern and Latin-European countries in the attitude towards
the reception of American-inspired modes of legal thought. Northern
countries, including Germany, Holland, Great Britain, and the Scan-
dinavian states, have incorporated much of the new American attitude
towards legal discourse as symbolized by law and economics. In these
countries, the assimilation of leading U.S. modes of legal thought,
such as balancing jurisprudence (including law and economics), have
tremendously increased in the last ten years. The so-called "New Eu-
ropean legal culture," mostly designed by scholars from Northern
countries where the university system does not lie in a state of disarray
and the law professors are mostly full-time scholars or (some of them)
77. See Mattei & Monti, supra note 0, at 13-14 (offering a summary of these critiques).
78. See STEFAN GRUNDMANN &JULES STUYCK, AN ACADEMIC GREEN PAPER ON EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAw (2002) (describing a commission on the harmonization of contract law in
Europe and arguments for various options that imply an assumption of efficiency
reasoning).
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policymakers, is much more similar to the U.S. legal culture than to
the traditional European one.79 This new European legal culture,
dominated by Northern scholars able to express themselves in En-
glish, is the most influential in European private-law drafting. The
outcome of such Northern reception is a technological attitude to-
wards legal discourse, traditionally foreign to the European style, that
legitimizes the strategy of those not politically accountable, techno-
bureaucratic elites within the European Commission.
Nevertheless, legal Europe is not made up only by Northern, An-
glophone elites. A variety of resisting attitudes can be found, too, par-
ticularly in Southern Latin countries that resent their marginalized
status in the exercise of building European law. Such Latin
countercultures are occasionally created simply out of the cultural in-
capacity to participate in policy-oriented discussions about the law, be-
cause their leading lawyers are still the product of a highly formalistic,
interpretive culture. Sometimes, such resisting attitudes are due to
the still notable strength of the "social mode of thought about the
law," which views the welfare state as a sign of social progress."0 This
attitude more or less consciously leads to the belief that the neo-Amer-
ican model carries with it reactionary eighteenth-century models of
capitalism."1 Indeed, the early resistance against law and economics
in Northern European countries was politically motivated by the same
belief.8 2 Such resistance has eventually been dismantled. One won-
ders if the Latin resistance will end up following the same path, or
whether they will be more skeptical towards the idea that taxation
should address problems of distribution (particularly after two de-
cades of tax reduction for the rich), in place of adjudication.
79. See HESSELINK, supra note 25, at 72-80 (discussing characteristics of the "New Euro-
pean legal culture," such as antiformalist trends).
80. A recent effort to "upgrade" the social dimension of the law in order to make it a
distinctive feature of a European model of private law can be found in a manifesto on
European social contract law produced by a number of European private-law scholars con-
cerned with the present trends of technocratic reasoning in European private law. See
Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, 10 EUR. L.J. 653 (2004).
81. Interestingly, important "social achievements" of the European legal tradition,
such as the "social function" of property rights, have been abandoned in the socially in-
spired European Charter of Rights. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, 2000 OJ. (C 364) 1, available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/charter/pdf/text-en.
pdf.
82. For an account of the early reception of law and economics in Europe, see Cooter &
Gordley, supra note 57.
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V. PAROCHIALISM, REINVENTION OF THE WHEEL, AND THE DECLINE
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
Recent scholarship in the United States has pointed out that law
and economics has entered a postmodern, interpretive phase of devel-
opment, in which its grand discourse over the nature of law, which
aims at objectivity, has yielded to a local micro-strategy grounded in
pragmatism."3 Using such strategy, legal scholarship pursues hegem-
ony and influence over the other sources of U.S. law by means of a
radically neopragmatist attitude. Such critical development has been
fostered by a general loss of faith (among experts) in the objectivity of
efficiency-based discourses, the very same faith that in previous times
has guaranteed law and economics (and economics in general) he-
gemony within postrealist approaches to legal scholarship and within
other social sciences.84 The importance of this evolution can be
viewed from the perspective of the legitimacy of legal discourse, if one
considers that the quest for objectivity had already been at the roots of
the legal process school in the 1950s.8 5 In the U.S. legal academy to-
day, law and economics has finally been unseated from its throne of
legal objectivity, so that its normative recipes need a new contingent
and local legitimacy in order to compete against a variety of opposite
political strategies.
Nevertheless, the objective and naturally desirable value of effi-
ciency is still a powerful ideology as soon as one abandons the cutting-
edge academic discourse. The traditional grand theory of law and ec-
onomics has been successfully received and implemented by the new,
all-powerful producers of global law, those international institutions
of global governance both private and public (the WTO, the World
Bank, the IMF, the mega law firms etc.).86 In this institutional scena-
rio, even lively scholarly debates occurring in only one place (however
hegemonic, such as the United States) cannot help but be parochial
and ineffective, because the real impact of law and economics has now
overtaken the domain of academia to conquer the domain of policy.
83. MINDA, supra note 14, at 85. But see STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL
THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM 130 (2000) (noting recent changes to
law and economics scholarship, but arguing that "law and economics retains its distinctly
modernist orientation").
84. See generally Cooter, supra note 18 (discussing the contribution of efficiency reason-
ing to legal scholarship).
85. See Wechsler, supra note 32.
86. The scenario resulting from the ascension of these institutions has been referred to
as "empire" and "polyarchy." See MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE (2000); Wit.
LIAM I. ROBINSON, PROMOTING POLYARCHY: GLOBALIZATION, U.S. INTERVENTION, AND HEGEM-
oNY (1996).
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Intellectual resistance and critique risk becoming marginalized at the
academic level (let alone at the level where policy decisions are actu-
ally carried out) by the self-content posture held by the mainstream
scholarship.
The acritical reception of law and economics, with its grand dis-
cursive strategy based on efficiency and objectivity, therefore becomes
the ideological apparatus of global authority. Efficiency reasoning in
the law is losing any critical potential as a scholarly tool because it
legitimizes as scientific the ideological assumptions of dominating
neoliberalism. Alternatively, if the postmodern vein of present-day
U.S. law and economics is ever understood, its reception will remain
embedded in postmodernism, which is "the logic by which global capi-
tal operates. "87
If one looks at the success of efficiency reasoning in the law as
discussed in this Essay, he will find at least three fundamental reasons
for it, both in the context of production (the United States) and in
that of reception (the periphery, including Europe): (1) the capacity
to provide a critical bite capable of deconstructing so many myths of
the state-centric perspective of the lawyer (who can forget the impact
of Calabresi's early observation that "[o] ur society is not committed to
preserving life at any cost"88); (2) a general framework to restructure
the role and the legitimacy of the lawyer, weakened by the realist ex-
treme "choice for candor"; and (3) a radically nonpositivistic intellec-
tual attitude, which allows thinking about the law outside of local
technicalities, and which is therefore easily understandable and adapt-
able in a variety of different contexts.
Beginning in the 1990s, after the relationship between the mar-
ket and the law had been subverted in U.S. legal theory (today it is the
market governing the law and not the other way around), the above
traits had been transformed, making law and economics much less
appealing. As a consequence, efficiency reasoning in the law today
seems imposed by means of more or less violent practices (e.g., condi-
tional loans) rather than freely chosen as a prestigious model by law-
yers worldwide.
Let us briefly discuss separately these three points.
As to the role of law and economics as a critique of the estab-
lished "state-centric" modes of thought, there is little doubt that, in
this era of global, single thought, and with the demise of the state and
87. HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 86, at 151.
88. GUIDO CALABREsI, THE COSTS OF ACcIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIs 17
(1970) [hereinafter THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS].
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the triumph of global corporate actors, the relationship between the
state and the market has been completely subverted. What was once
the positivistic notion of the omnipotent state, whose values and pri-
orities, reflected in the law, could be carried out at any price (or with-
out paying any attention to such prices), has been so effectively
challenged that today the law finds itself governed by the market
rather than the other way around. Law and economics certainly
played a strong intellectual role in this reversal. After all, the notion
of the law as a set of incentives rather than as a pyramid of binding
orders, as a carrot rather than a stick, was all-important in unseating
state-centrism from its once dominating jurisprudential status.
The global diffusion of notions, such as competition between le-
gal orders, soft law, default rules, social norms, etc., indicates the
weakness of the traditional state-centric perspective, so that what was
once the most original contribution of Guido Calabresi's The Costs of
Accidents is today the accepted truth. As a consequence of this reversal
of the relationship between the state and the market, the relationship
between the law and the market has also been subverted. Not only
has the law been freed from the lethal hug of the state, but also the
idea that the law is produced by market forces is now generally ac-
cepted. While public-choice economists were showing how regulation
and legislation are captured, law and economics scholars were work-
ing out all sorts of Darwinian evolutionary theories by which "invest-
ment" in litigation resources was seen as producing "returns" in terms
of efficient rules.89 In this subverted scenario, reflecting its new domi-
nantjurisprudential status, law and economics offers very little critical
insight. On the one hand, its approach is self-proclaimed as "positive"
rather than "normative," so that, because of its scientific self-portrayal,
the economic approach willingly declines any political confrontation.
Secondly, law and economics not only posits that the law is up for sale,
but also that its sale is "natural" and should be so. Its discourses are
consequently located in the conservative mainstream. These dis-
courses keep restating the usual, cynical ideological platitudes, and, as
a result, they are unattractive and banal to inquisitive and critical
minds. What do they expect? The political process is captured and
adjudication reflects investments. To the contrary, The Costs of Acci-
dents was a critique of the accepted, narrowly state-centric modes of
thought, and contained a strongly normative argument in which jus-
tice and distribution, in addition to efficiency, claimed a role. Thus,
89. See George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.
51 (1977).
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Calabresi's approach has been so attractive worldwide, suddenly giv-
ing law and economics a reputation as a civilizing movement, capable
of using efficiency as a critique and of guiding choices in the name of
justice.9°
As to the capacity to restore the lawyer's claim of objectivity, we
have observed how pragmatism and micro-strategies have been substi-
tuted for the early grand discourses. Once law and economics con-
quered the mainstream status by marginalizing all openly normative
and redistributive arguments, it transformed the choice for candor,
typical of realist jurisprudence, into an even more extreme choice for
cynicism. Discourses on distribution and values, that were never
marginalized by the early work of Calabresi, and that gave a "human
face" to the law and economics movement, have been abandoned.
Whoever (including this author) was writing about law and economics
in the mid-1980s in Europe was busy preaching that there was some-
thing else beyond the Chicago economic cynicism. The transforma-
tion of U.S. law and economics into an organized industry has
expelled any distributional worry from the hard core of the discipline.
Those scholars and lawyers who worried about values, about the just
distribution of resources, about the problems of unconditionally ac-
cepting the paradigm of the homo oeconomicus, are now depicted as
bleeding-heart idealists, or naive first-year law students, simply incapa-
ble of understanding the real logic that explains how things work. Of
course there is not much to gain, in terms of legitimacy, for the legal
profession to cynically recognize that (1) legal rules are up for sale,
and (2) that whoever can invest more in legal adjudication and law-
making (including hiring more expensive lawyers and lobbyists) will
"naturally" benefit from the returns of investment by winning the case
or obtaining a business-friendly legal environment. The loss of pres-
tige for the lawyer's profession follows as much from being deter-
mined by political biases as being determined by business interests.
As to the nonpositivism, universalism, and adaptability of law and
economics to different contexts, we can only observe here a dramatic
involution into technicality and parochialism. The early grand pic-
tures and theoretically ambitious reconstructions are being substi-
tuted more and more by incredibly boring papers, endlessly
discussing, with an inconsiderate use of mathematics and graphs, irrel-
evant details of a manager's compensation scheme, improbable pre-
dictions of jury behaviors, or other similarly context-specific, detail-
driven, and user-unfriendly ideas. The cultural desolation of most of
90. See THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 88, at 24-26.
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the papers presently circulating in the mainstream professional jour-
nals is evident to anyone that has approached the career of the legal
scholar with a normal cultural endowment. There exists a tiny clique
of insiders, usually repeating more or less the same stuff in dozens of
papers, constantly cited, in what is little more that an exercise of cut
and paste, accompanied by a display of trendy connections in Ivy
League schools. I am not criticizing the complete lack of attention to
anything that fails to occur in elite U.S. schools, as if these were the
only places where scholarship was done. Even products of these elite
institutions are simply ignored if they come from people not recog-
nized in the tiny mainstream just mentioned. Think about the ab-
sence of communication between law and economics and neo-
institutional economics, each one barricaded in its own little niche of
professionalism. Or think about the appalling ignorance of so much
of the literature dealing with social norms, where fundamental contri-
butions of the legal anthropologist (I do not mean only in the French
literature, but also in the Anglo-American literature), are simply ig-
nored in order to be rediscovered. When economists who are not
legally-trained enter the business, the institutional characteristics of
American law-very superficially gleaned from three years of law
school (at best) or by secondhand quick reading or hearsay conversa-
tions with legal colleagues-are universalized and taken for granted."'
They become a sort of an economist's reflection on the legal system,
in which all the complexities and the power structures of the real life
of the law are simply obliterated. This attitude exacts a toll, because
so many of the solutions that are presented as universally efficient are,
indeed (if they are at all), efficient only in the U.S. institutional envi-
ronment-itself very different from most others. It does not take long
for the scholar abroad, capable of accessing the rich treasury of
worldly legal scholarship, and perhaps even that of neighboring disci-
plines, to observe that, in importing law and economics, he might
have imported a "defective product." After its early grand promises
(for which it was worth fighting), law and economics has evolved lo-
cally into a parochial tool of propaganda of an established anti-intel-
lectual mainstream turning everything, even culture, into
technological skills. When law is turned into an expensive technology,
it abandons being a product of culture.92
American legal scholars at the beginning of the new millennium
are themselves experiencing a decline in international prestige. Their
91. I develop this argument in MATTEI, supra note 1.
92. See PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLAR-
SHIP (1999).
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legal ideology, marketed worldwide without attention to what is hap-
pening at home, is frequently the product of a good faith attitude
often motivated by justice (such as the attitude of the international
human rights movement). Nevertheless, the simple-mindedness fol-
lowing decades of intellectual leadership, the attitude of always talk
and never listen, and to always teach and never learn, and the high degree
of technocratic parochialism, has started to exact its toll. Despite be-
ing leveraged by institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, U.S.
models fail to persuade the cutting-edge international scholars be-
cause of the models' abstract technological nature, consequent cul-
tural naivet6, and incapacity to account for local complexities and
diversity. International scholars capable of firsthand observations and
independent from local, biased accounts, today resent the decline of
the legal academy's role as a powerful, independent check on the U.S.
political process. American legal scholars have either abandoned
their critical thinking following the remarkable degree of cosmopoli-
tism in the early season of legal realism, or, when self-perceived as
critical, have lost every kind of political bite after being trapped in a
variety of postmodernist attitudes. To understand the legal academy's
lack of a critical role, look at the hundreds of pages devoted in Ameri-
can books on criminal procedure to the celebration of the procedural
guarantees of due process at trial (mostly conquests of the Warren
Court years). Unfortunately, no attention is ever devoted to the fact
that only a very tiny minority of defendants will end up at trial, and
will therefore enjoy such guarantees. 93 Most defendants, over-
whelmed by the superior economic and political power of the prose-
cutor, enter plea bargains.94
Law and economics experts display even stronger loyalty to their
own system, too often turning academia from a critical check on the
political process into an agency of propaganda. Consider the domi-
nating approach taken by experts after the Enron scandal. A humble
reflection on this conflict of interest as a pervading market failure,
possibly as difficult to conceptualize and as devastating for free-market
ideology as externalities or monopolies, would have been in order.
To the contrary, some scholars have been busy criticizing the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act95 for increasing the criminal sanctions without
93. Elisabetta Grande, Italian CriminalJustice: Borrowing and Resistance, 48 Am. J. CoMP.
L. 227, 251-52 (2000).
94. Id. For the appalling results, see Jim DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIvE DAYS
TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES OF THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000), which details
the results of the New York based "Innocence Project."
95. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
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considering the literature arguing that fines are an efficient remedy
against white-collar opportunism.9 6 Other papers have pointed out
the quick and effective reaction of the system to address an aberra-
tion, claiming that the emergence of the scandal was proof that the
market could cure itself.9 7 An approach attempting to benefit from
the critiques of efficiency reasoning in the law would observe how the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was completely captured by the interests it was
supposed to control, and that it is little more than a facade to mask
the persistent underfunding of the Securities and Exchange
Commission.98
Lawyers, as a professional group, do not live in a world com-
pletely separated from their social context. It is therefore natural that
their professional perception is, at least in part, the product of the
general social perception. A loss of faith and a sense of betrayal from
the "American model" of the rule of law are now more diffused even
between cultivated European intellectual elites, of which lawyers are a
constituent part. Scandals such as Enron, Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib,
the "War on the Bill of Rights,"99 or the hundreds of accused individu-
als, mostly black, sitting on death row because they are incapable of
"investing" enough in defense, are quickly consuming the residual
capital of the worldwide prestige of the American rule of law.
CONCLUSION
Hegel once said that if there is something we can learn from his-
tory, it is that we can never learn from history.7°° Scholarship in social
science should avoid gazing into the crystal ball because political vari-
ables are too complex to be predicted. Predicting the fall of an aca-
demic movement using data stemming from previous histories of
declining patterns of prestige of academic movements in Western law
can be counterintuitive when the movement is as influential and
mainstream as law and economics today. Nevertheless, observing the
96. See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in
Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937, 943 (2003).
97. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28J. Copp. L. 1, 3 (2002).
98. Cf Ugo Mattei & Filippo Sartori, Conflitto Continuo. A Un Anno da Enron Negli Stati
Uniti e in Europa, 34 POLITICA DEL DIRITrO 177 (2003).
99. See NAT HENTOFF, THE WAR ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE GATHERING RESISTANCE
(2003) (discussing the erosion of individual rights through recent actions of the U.S. gov-
ernment in response to the events of Sept. 11, 2001).
100. See generally GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY (J.
Sibree trans., Dover Publ'ns 1956) (1899).
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parable of efficiency reasoning in the law, through a global perspec-
tive, might be of some interest.
Once upon a time in New Haven, Connecticut, there was a young
lawyer-economist, cosmopolitan in learning, and critical in spirit. He
taught lawyers worldwide that no value, not even human life, is pro-
tected at any price, and that acknowledging this reality could help us
clarify our priorities. This insight has produced the final collapse of
legal positivism and has opened a daunting space for legal creativity to
imagine a better, fairer, and more efficient social organization. That
lawyers and economists should work together for this common task
was Calabresi's recommendation. Beginning in the 1980s, the inter-
disciplinary work and the merger of legal and economic approaches
became dominant in the United States. This happened when a politi-
cal program, known as Reagan-Thatcherism, was pursuing its final ef-
fort to win the Cold War. Deregulation, privatization, downsizing,
outsourcing, and dismantling of the welfare sector were some of the
strategies used to find the tremendous amount of money necessary to
bring the military confrontation to a level impossible for the Soviet
Union to face. This political program was friendly with what has been
called the "Imperialism of Economics," 10 1 and the economic aid it
could offer caused the ideological aspects of the economic approach
(market conservatism) to prevail quickly over the genuine tension of
critical understanding. Law and economics has been transformed
into an industry dominated by politically conservative economists.
The models produced by this movement have been exported world-
wide by organizational efforts (within and outside U.S. academic insti-
tutions) and by its tremendous influence in the programs of the
international financial institutions. This triumphant model, neverthe-
less, merges with outdated aspects of both the legal and the economic
approach, possibly because cutting-edge minds, both in the law and in
economics, ended up abandoning the field, tired of its ideological
and simplistic blend.1"2
Economists have contributed to law and economics an ideology
of individualism and of property rights that is too extreme and biased
to reflect any kind of real-life institutional structure.103 This idea, di-
rectly stemming from eighteenth-century naturalistic conceptions of
property as a zone of individual sovereignty, insulated from public or
private intrusion, cannot account for opportunistic behavior, conflicts
of interest, rent seeking, or for the many other failures of markets and
101. Cooter, supra note 18.
102. Calabresi's intellectual history is very revealing from this point of view.
103. See MArTrEI, supra note 1, at 56-57.
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private institutions. Individualism cannot explain why the justice mo-
tive is many times more important than the profit motive as ajustifica-
tion for human behavior. 10 4
A variety of other assumptions typical of neoclassical economics,
and of its monetarist amplification, have been subsumed in "structural
reform" programs, without sufficient consideration of the many criti-
ques and challenges to the paradigm of homo oeconomicus stemming
from economists from the neo-institutional school: Paul David, Brian
Arthur, or Herbert Simon in the United States alone.
On the other hand, sophisticated lawyers today are no longer
stuck in a monistic and static conception of the legal order. For a
long time, lawyers have understood the complexity stemming from
the plurality of legal orders, both private and public, that govern, in a
polity, the relationship between individuals and social groups. These
lawyers no longer believe in abstract formulas, in science as legitimiza-
tion, and no longer do they just hide with numbers and formulas the
platitudes whose only role is to grant some legitimacy to decisions bi-
ased in favor of the stronger market actors. These lawyers realize that
many norms do not come from the public sector, but they also know
that economic relationships must be governed by an effective and au-
thoritative public sector, actually granting equal opportunities and
taking care of imbalances of power. These lawyers understand that
most recipes originating from the dominant blend of law and eco-
nomics, and the structural reforms inspired by efficiency reasoning in
the law, will leave us with the ruins of a public sector when we finally
wake up from the neoliberal booze.10 5
When an approach to the law loses its critical strengths and
merely legitimizes a status quo, it betrays the function that in Western
law has always granted prestige to academic thinking: a strong inde-
pendent check on the political process.
Historically, when such a phenomenon happens, new movements
and ideas seize a leading role, exposing the uncritical approaches as
obsolete and unworthy of admiration. It is impossible to predict
where the new paradigms will come from and how long it will take for
the old ones to be substituted. Leading paradigms never came with
simplistic answers. We know that they emerged by asking basic ques-
104. See NADER, supra note 24, at 216-17 (stating that the justice motive is necessary to
the "social legitimation of law").
105. See HERTZ, supra note 20.
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tions, such as the questions about the relationship between efficiency
and distribution that Calabresi posed more than forty years ago. To
this question, law and economics-now an industry-has denied
attention.
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